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tion of two or more of these defendants to improperly release
Samuel Snow from his imprisonment, thus obstructing the pro-
cess of the United States. If you are satisfied there was, you
will find so many as entered into such a conspiracy and combina-
tion guilty under the first count of the indictment.
This case will point out the caution with which those in autho-
rity should proceed. The steps taken could not possibly redound'
to the benefit of Samuel Snow, for the discharge obtained could
not protect him against an examination into his offence before the
grand jury. Instbad of having him to deal with, if no interfer-
ence had occurred, we are now engaged in examining into the
case growing out of the interference. It seems incomprehensible
why a jealousy should exist between the state and the National
Government, and especially between the judiciaries of the two.
Identity of interests, affecting the individual in both capacities as
a citizen of a state and the General Government alike, when
rightly understood, can leave no room for differences.
The judiciary, solely interested in the faithful execution of the
laws, should hesitate to interfere with each other, because of the
conflict which must necessarily follow derogatory to both.
You, gentlemen of the jury, to whom this case is about to be
submitted for final action, will enter upon the consideration
thereof, I am sure, in that true spirit which recognises its obliga-
tions to both governments, and above all, to that spirit of justice
and of right on which all government and laws securely rest.
The jury returned a verdict, finding McAfee (the judge who
issued the writ) and Doss (the attorney of the prisoner suing out
the writ) guilty, and Snow and Wray not guilty.
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question whether there are any debts or legacies for the payment of
which the lands of an estate in the course of administration are properly
liable, is one clearly within the jurisdiction of the Court of Probate, and
the decision of that court upon that question will be final and conclu-
sive, if no appeal be taken : Rall v.. Woodman, 49 or 50 N. H.
All claims against a solvent estate are barred by the statute in three
years after the granting of administration, specified eases excepted,
unless suit thereon was commenced within the three years, and was not
adjusted at the close of said term : Id.
The administrator cannot by any promise in writing or otherwise,
take any claim out from the operation of this statute, nor is he at liberty
to omit to plead that statute of limitation in any case where it is appli-
cable: Id.
The judge of Probate should not, therefore, grant to an administrator
license to sell lands of the estate, if solvent,, after the expiration of three.
years from the granting of administration, except in the cases specified
in the statute, unless there are suits against the estate pending and
unadjusted at the expiration of the three years, nor in cases of insol-
vency, except in cases of appeal from the commissioner, or in cases of
review pending and unadjusted at the close of said term, or for other
similar reasons: Id.
And when such special reason exists for extending the time, the
administrator should be required to make his application for license
within reasonable time after the cause for delay has been adjusted or
ceases to exist, else his application should be refused: Id.
An administrator, whether the estate is solvent or insolvent, is bound
to execute his trust in a reasonable time. And if he unreasonably delay
and neglect to apply land of the estate for the payment of debts, his
right to sell the land, his lien upon it for the payment of debts, will be
forfeited and lost, and the heirs or devisees may enter and hold the land
against him: Id.
AsSUMPSIT.
Services where no Compensation is fixed-Evidence of Value of
Serviccs.-The refusal to permit a question asked on cross-examination
to be answered, is not cause for reversal, even though the question was
one which was properly asked in the latitude allowed on cross-examina-
tion, where it clearly appears that such ruling could not have prejudi-
cially affected the losing party: .Missouri River Railroad Co. v. Rich-
ards, 7 Kans.
A. person who has personal knowledge of the services rendered, and
has a knowledge of the value of the services, and what was usually paid
for such services in the East, is competent to testify what the services
were worth; although he may not have known of any established price
for such services in the vicinity where rendered : Id.
When the by-laws of a corporation provide that the officers shall receive
such compensation for their services as the board of directors shall fix
and allow, and the board has not fixed any compensation, a secretary
who has rendered services is entitled to recover therefor, unless there was
an understanding that lie was to render the services without comnpensa-
tion : i.
The jury has a right in making up their verdict to use their general
knowledge, such as any man may bring to the subject : Id.
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BANKRUPTCY.
Jurisdiction of State Courts qfter Filing of Petition-Hoinestead.-
When the United States courts under the Bankrupt Act have acquired
jurisdiction of the estate of the bankrupt, the state courts lose
jurisdiction of all claims against him provable under the Bankrupt
Act, except specific liens upon his property, and legal or equitable
claims of title thereto, and the homestead and exemption provisions of
the Constitution of 1868 do not create such a specific lien upon or title
to his estate in favor of his family, as may be heard and adjudicated by
the state courts pending the proceedings in bankruptcy: lloolfolk v.
Woolfolk, 42 or 43 Ga.
Whether said claim is such a debt in favor of the family as may be
proven before the Bankrupt Court, independently o" the exemption
granted by the bankrupt law to the bankrupt, is for that court alone to
decide: -rd.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Endorsement after maturity.-If a promissory note, payable to the
order of a person in whose hands it is invalid, is taken from him before
maturity, but not endorsed by him till overdue, or till after notice of a
defence, the endorsement does not relate back to the time of the taking,
and the endorsee has no better title than the endorser himself had,
although it was taken in good faith and for value : Clark v. Whitaker,
49 or 50 N. H.
Usury.-When the payee of a note endorses it after maturity, and
suit is brought by the endorsee against the maker and endorser, and the
plea by the maker sets up usury, such plea by the maker does not affect
the liability of the endorser upon his contract of endorsement after the
maturity of the paper. The contract of endorsement was a new and
distinct contract not affected by usury between the payee and maker in
the hands of the endorsee without notice, and the endorser in a suit
against him by the endorsee cannot set up his own illegal act in taking
usury to defeat a recovery against himself as endorser: .Frank v. Long-
street, Sedgwick & Co., 42 or 43 Ga.
CONTRACT.
Construction-Illegality never presume.-Wben it is averred in a
petition that language in a contract which is susceptible of two mean-
ings was intended by the parties to have one of such meanings, upon
issue joined by demurrer, the contract will be construed as having that
meaning : Craft v. Bent et al., 8 Kans.
Under a contract to pay for land upon the execution of a deed, interest
does not begin to run until tender of the deed : Id.
A decree requiring the performance of a contract by one party should
also receive if possible performance by the other : d.
Courts will never presume a contract to be illegal. Its illegality must
be shown : Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.
lTayistrate or Police Con"t cannot commn77?it except .for the vrry Ofi'nce
charged.-Although it is competent, upon an indictment, when the
respondent is not guilty of the offence as charged, for the jury to find
him guilty of some minor offence which is necessarily included in the
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offence as charged, yet this power is not conferred upon magistrates or
police courts : State v. Runnals, 49 or 
50 N. H.
The charge as made in the complaint and warrant determines whether
the magistrate can try and determine the case, or whether he can only
hear the evidence and determine whether he will bind over or discharge
the respondent : Id.
If the offence charged in the complaint and warrant is one that may
be punishable by a fine of more than twenty dollars, or imprisonment
in jail for more than six months, the magistrate has no power to deter-
vaine it, but must either bind over or discharge: Id.
In such cases he should not acquit; for, when he cannot convict and
pass sentence, he has no power to acquit : R/.
The charge for assault and battery is made a special exception by
statute, and in that class of cases the magistrate- may acquit, or may
convict and pass sentence within certain limits, or he may bind over,-
if, in his judgment, the punishment should exceed his jurisdiction to
inflict: et.
In all criminal cases where the magistrate or police court have .juris-
diction, the Supreme Court has also original concurrent jurisdiction : Id.
Police Court-Jurisdction.-Where a complaint before a police
court for larceny described an offence the maximum punishment of
which was greater than a police court had power to impose, it was held,
that such court had no jurisdiction to try such offence, and that an
appeal from its sentence, although it was to pay a fine within the power
of that court to impose, must be dismissed : State v. Dolby, 49 or
50 N. H.
Held, also, that the value of the goods as stated in the complaint
must govern the question of jurisdiction, and not the value as found on
trial, and that this defect could not be cured by amendment in the
appellate court: Id.
Larceny.-Upon a trial for larceny of a horse, a bill of sale to the
horse offered by the prisoner without showing alliunde its bonO. fide ex-
ecution, is inadmissible as evidence: Taylor v. The State, 42 or 43 Ga.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
.Assignments for Benefit of Creditors-Infancy of Assiqnor.-Where,
at the time an assignment of property in trust for the benefit of cred-.
itors was executed, one of the assignors was an infant, of the age of
nineteen years, only: Ield, That that fact, alone, rendered the assign-
ment void, as matter of law, as against creditors; upon the ground
that an infant having a right to disaffirm his contracts, an assignment
by him does not, and cannot. as matter of law, devote the property
assigned, absolutely and unconditionally, to the payment of his debts:
Yates et al. v. .lon, 61 Barb.
The general principle, that a sale or assignment by an infant is void-
able only, and not void, until he elects to avoid it, and remains valid
until such election, does not apply to such a case: Id.
Nor is it of the least consequence that the infant assignor did not
elect to disaffirm or revoke, but by his silence, afterwards, consented to,
and ratified the assignment. The vice lies in the power he had f,- dis-
affirm or avoid : Id.
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DEED.
Want of consideration-Subsequent Grantee.-A subsequent grantee
cannot ordinarily attack a prior deed of his grantor for fraud or want
of consideration: Gray v. Ulrich et al., 7 Kans.
But where he has the equitable title at the time of the execution of
the prior deed, then he may question the interest conveyed by such
deed: Id.
DESERTER.
Disfranchsement of.-The United States Act of March 3d 1865 does
not contemplate the disfranchisement of deserters except after convic-
tion by court-martial: ,Secerance v. .Aealei/, 49 or 50 N. H.
DOWER.
A widow, in this state, is entitled to dower in lands bargained by the
husband in his lifetime to a third person, the purchase-money remaining
unpaid, and the title to the land being retained by the husband in him-
self until his death: Slaughter v. Gu4peper et al., 42 or 43 Ga.
ESTATE FOR YEARS.
An estate for years may be bought and sold as other real estate, even
against the consent of the grantor, if there" be nothing in the deed to
prevent it: Clark v. Herring & Mock, 42 or 43 Ga.
EVIDENCE. See Assumpsit ; Criminal Law.
The admission of parol evidence to contradict a note and prove con-
ditions not expressed therein is error; while the Jhiltre of considera-
tion, in whole, or in part, may be given in evidence, new conditions
cannot: Lester & Lester v. Fowler et al., Scaife v. Beall, 42 or 43 Ga.
FORMER SUIT.
Judgment in, when not a Bar to a subsequent .Action.-Creditors who
had seized, upon attachment, the property of their debtors in the hands
of an assignee for the benefit of creditors, being sued by the assignee,
for the conversion of the property, set up as a defence, that the assign-
ment was invalid, for fraud. The defence was ruled out, because the
attachment had been set aside for irregularity, and the creditors were
thus left without justification, and were mere tort-feasors. The question
as to the validity of the assignment was not litigated and determined,
as it was held not to arise. Held, That the judgment in that action
was no bar to a subsequent action, by the creditors against the assignors
and assignee, to set aside the assignment: Yates et al. v. Lyon, 61 Barb.
HIGHWAY.
Dedication- Use-Abandonnent.-The laying out of a highway by
the selectmei of a town without an application for it, is invalid. The
provision of the Revised Statutes, ch. 53, s. 7, that no highway not laid
out agreeably to statute law shall be deemed a public highway, unless
the same has been used by the public for twenty years, operates to dis-
continue all highways not so used, and dependin.g upon dedication, even
when used long enough to become public highways under the former
laws: 8tate v. Morse, 49 or 50 N. H.
The jury cannot rightfully presume that a highway has been laid out
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
agreeably to statute law, from the mere use of it by the public for any
period less than twenty years : Id.
Proof, that part of an entire highway, the laying out of which was
defective, has been used by the public fbr the term of twenty years, is
evidence of a legal highway, as to the part so used, although no-distinct
act of acceptance by the town be shown : Id.
Where the record of a laying out of a highway is defective in failing
to show a particular statute requisite, but enough is shown to render it
probable that all the requisites had been complied with, and at the same
time the record ,is so anbient as to afford a presumption, that by the
death of the actors it could not be amended, there a jury on such evi-
dence, aided by the fact that the highway had been opened by the town
and used for many years, though less than twenty, would be justified in
finding the highway to have been legally laid out: M/.
So long as a highway once established is kept open and fenced out,
and the public never excluded, but it has always been used as a public
highway by the landowners for access to their farms, and for other
farming purposes, the right of the public will not be deemed to be lost
by abandonment: Id.
Where a road is established by use alone, it is not necessarily limited
to the travelled track, and the ditches on each side, but a jury would
be at liberty to find that the easement extended over the whole space
marked by fences which had been maintained more than twenty years,
and which gave about the usual width of a highway: Id.
HOIJESTEAD. See Bankriptcy.
A widow is not entitled to a homestead and personal exemption out
of the property of the intestate in addition to her dower and provision
for her year's support: Rust, Johnson & Co. et a. v. Billingslea et al.,
42 or 43 Ga.
The crop made upon a rented place is subject to the lien of the land-
lord for his rent, and if the same has been set apart as an exemption
for the benefit of the family of the tenant, is nevertheless subject to
levy and sale for the payment of the rent, the claim for rent being in
the nature of the purchase-money: Idarral v. Feagin, 42 or 43 Ga.
INFANT. See Debtor and Creditor.
INTEREST.
In the Absence of any Agreement to yay, not collectable after Payment
of Debt.-When there is no agreement to pay interest, interest when
allowable, is allowed, not as part of the contract, but as an incident, and
by way of damages for the default, to make the creditor good for the
loss he has sustained by reason of the breach or default: The Southern
Central Railroad Company v. The Town of Moravia, 61 Barb.
In that class of cases, it has always been held, that after the princi-
pal of the debt had been paid, and received in full, no action could be
maintained to recover interest: Id.
The defendant subscribed to the capital stock of a railroad company,
the amount of the subscription to be paid "in such instalments, and at
such times, as the board of directors might lawfully direct." Several
calls were made, by the directors, amounting in, the agg-egate to the
precise sum subscribed, which were all paid by the defendant, but not
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at the times designated in the calls, and receipts given. Nothing was
said about interest, and no claim made for it, until after the whole prin-
cipal had been paid: teld, That an action would not lie to recover
interest on the several amounts specified in the calls, for the time they
remained unpaid after the day designated for payment, by the call: Id.
LANDLORD AND TENANT, See .omestcad.
A tenant for a year under a contract of rent stands in the shoes of
his landlord, and in general is not a purchaser entitled to notice of
equities against his landlord in favor of third persons: 0larh v. Herring
& Mock, 42 or 43 Ga.
A tenant cannot attorn to one who claims adversely to his landlord,
even to prevent an illegal eviction by the sheriff: Donkle v. Kohn, 42
or 43 Ga.
When a party sublets to another under a contract that the sublessee
is to pay die rent due, this is not such a claim for rent by the landlord
as may be enforced against the sublessee by levy of a distraint warrant:
Smith v. Turnley et al., 42 or 43 Ga.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE 0F. See Administrators.
Effect of a Partial Paijment.-A partial payment made upon a prom-
issory note, by the adujinistratrix of one of the makers, a portion of which
payment is from assets of the estate, if made before the Statute of Limi-
tations has run against the note, saves the obligation from the operation
of the statute, up to that time. And this, although the payment was
made without the consent of the other administrator: Heath et al., Ad-
m'rs., v. Grenell, Admn'r., 61 Barb.
An administratrix making a payment upon a note after the Statute of
Limitations has run against it, not out of the assets of the estate, but
out of her own funds, will not be deemed as acting in her capacity of
administratrix, even though she directs the payment to be made upon
that specific debt. Nor can such a payment be construed into a promise,
or as indicating an intention to revive or continue the demand against
the estate: Id.
Any payment upon such a note, made by the administratrix with her
own money, cannot bind the estate, or affect it in any way, any more
than if it had been the act of a stranger: 17.
Where an administratrix directed her agent to pay a certain sum on
her intestate's debts, out of money of her own, giving no specific direc-
tion to pay a particular demand, or any part of it, and the agent, in the
exercise of his own discretion, in distributing the fund, made a partial
payment upon that demand: Beld, That the general direction to the
agent could not be construed into a promise or intention to continue
that particular demand, and not being made from the assets of the
estate, the payment could have no bearing against the estate : 1(l.
,LORTGAGES.
Individual property is not embraced by a mortgage executed by part-
ners on their partnership property except it is specifically set forth and
described : Reid v. Goohoin, 42 or 43 Ga.
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NEw TRIAL.
How far granted--Amendmernt after Verdict.-The rule now adopted
by this court is, that when a general verdict depends upon the finding
of several disputed facts or questions, some of which were not and could
not have been affected by any error in the ruling of the court, and others
of which were or may have been thus injuriously affected, the verdict will
not be wholly set aside, and the case thrown open again to i new trial
on all points; but such findings of facts as have beei had upori the
merits, and to which no valid objection can be made, shall remain undis-
turbed, and the verdict shall be set aside, and a ne trial granted oly
on those points necessary to correct some error or mistake : Janvrin v.
Fogg, 49 or 50 N. H.
And when the court can see that the only question of fact in the case
has been submitted to and settled by the jury, under some mistaken
ruling of law, in precisely the same manner and upon the same evidence,'
that it must have been submitted and settled, had the rulings upon the
law been correct, the verdict will not be set aside : Icl.
Amendments to be passed upon by the court, and which could not
affect the finding of the jury, may be made after verdict, andfjudgment
then rendered upon the verdict : -7d.
And if amendments may be made in the -cause itself after verdict,
they may also be made in the testimony relating to the competency of
records or other papers used as evidence in the cause, when they are not
of a character to affect the finding of the jury, and'are addressed to the
court alone: Id.
Where a mortgage of personal property was introduced in evidence,
which proved not to be sufficiently stamped so as to make it competent,
hehl," that this evidence of competency, being addressed only to the
court, and being such that it could not have been affected, the verdict
of the jury may be supplied by properly stamping the mortgage after
verdict. And where that was the only ground of objection to the evidence,
judgment will then be rendered upon the verdict: Id.
NUISANCE.
Private Actioa for-Higkway-Mill-darn.-An individual sustaining
an injury from a public nuisance, differing in- kind from that sustained
by the community in general, may maintain an action therefor: Venard
v. Cross, 7 Kansas.
Proof of service of the notices provided by section 4 of the Road Act
of' 1864 was not required to be filed, recorded, or preserved, and a failure
of the record to show such proof of service does not avoid the record:
Md.
The right of flowing lands obtained by proceedings under the Mill-
])am Act does not include the right to overflow or obstruct a highway:
.M.
Chapter 66 of the General Statutes, commonly known as the "Mill-
Dam Act," is constitutional and valid: Id.
PARtDON.
Under the Constitution of Georgia the Governor may exercise tha
pardoning power before conviction as well as after conviction. WARNE'
J., dissenting: Dominick v. Bowdoin, 42 or 43 Ga.
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Where one was in custody under a bench-warrant founded upon an
indictment by the grand jury, and sued out a writ of habeas corpus
before a judge of the Superior Court, and as a ground of discharge,
offered a pardon from the Governor for the offence charged against him,
and the judge refused to receive and consider the pardon : Hclhi, That
this was manifest error by the court. It is the duty of all courts sitting
for the purpose of habeas corpus or otherwise to receive, without further
evidence of its verity, the pardon of the governor under the great seal
of the state: Id.
Pardons obtained by fraud are void, and upon suggestion of fraud
upon the trial of habeas corpus it was the duty of the judge presiding to
have heard the evidence and passed upon its merits, as to the facts in
the particular case, and it was error in the court to hold that this ques-
tion could only be inquired of by the jury: Id.
Pardons bejbre conviction are based upon the confession of the im-
puted guilt of the accused, and before such pardon takes effect it must
be accepted by the accused, and when the plea of pardon'by sureties
fails to set up its acceptance by their principal, evidenced by his applica-
tion for the pardon, and delivery to him, or his acceptance of it when
done, the pardon granted without the application of the principal, and
not evinced by his acceptance of it, is of no effect: Bullock, Governor,
v. Jancock et al., 42 or 43 Ga.
PARTNERSHIP.
Whatever may be the interest of the parties, and whether they be,
in fact, partners under the bargain or not, they will be liable as such,
if they so act as to hold themselves out to the world as such : Sankey
& Shorter v. fall, Moses & Co., 42 or 43 Ga.
The sayings of one of the partners, not expressly, or by implication,
brought to the knowledge of the other, are no evidence against that
other in an issue of partnership or no partnership: Id.
PAYMENT.
When may be recovered back.-When a party pays an illegal de-
mand with a full knowledge of all the facts which render such demand
illegal, without an immediate and urgent necessity therefor, or unless
to release his person or property from detention, or to prevent an imme-
diate seizure of the same, such payment must be deemed to be volun-
tary, and cannot be recovered back ; and the fact that the party at the
time of making the payment files a written protest, does not make the
payment involuntary: Commissioners v. Jgalker, 8 Kans.
REVIEw.
Amendment.-When there is a written contract between the parties,
it is for the court to give construction to that contract, if it becomes
necessary, but it is for the jury to find whether the acts done which
constitute the basis of the present action, were done under that contract
or some other which was not written : Colebrook v. Merrill, 49 or 50
N.H.
In actions of review the statute has placed the whole subject of
amending the pleadings and of admitting new pleadings, entirely within
the discretion of the court: Id.
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In the trial of an action upon review the court may, in its discretion,
reject or disallow a demurrer to the original declaration : Id.
What is Pleadable in Action of. -Upon review, no matter or thing
which has arisen since the judgment in the original cause, can be
pleaded in bar of the further maintenance of the suit: Zollar v. Jan-
vrin, 49 or 50 N. H.
A review is a new trial of the issues before tried between the parties,
unless the court grant leave to amend the pleadings: Rd.
An action of review is a chose in action, which, in virtue of an adju-
dication of bankruptcy, vests in the assignee; who is, alone, empowered
to prosecute or defend it, in his own name: Id.
SLANDER.
Words spoken in heat-Migation of Damages.-Where slanderous
words, which are per se actionable, are spoken in a moment of heat. and
passion, induced by some improper conduct immediately preceding on
the part of the plaintiff, the said circumstances under which the words
were spoken are not a complete defence to the action for slander, but
should be considered by the jury only in mitigation of damages: Hiles
v. Harrington, 8 Kans.
In an action of slander for words spoken which are per se actionable,
where the petition does not allege any special damages, the jury may
give a verdict for such general damages as the plaintiff may have sus-
tained; and all damages, which are the necessary and natural result of
the words spoken, are general damages: Id.
And in such an action damage is presumed without any proof of actual
damage, and if no special damage is pleaded, no general damage proved,
nor exemplary damage allowed by the jury, still the jury should allow
nominal damages for the plaintiff: Id.
And in such a case, whether exemplary damages should be allowed,
is a question for the jury, under all the circumstances: the law would
permit such damages: Id.
Opinion of Witness as to meanivg of W1ords used.-Where, in an
action for slander, the plaintiff proved the' s eaking by defendant of
other defamatory words for the purpose of showing malice, the defend-
ant will not be allowed to ask the witness how he understood those
words: Shaw and Wife v. Shaw, 49 or 50 N. H.
Such inquiry will be allowed in reference to the words charged in the
declaration only, when they are ambiguous, and with caution: d.
STAMPS. See .New Trial.
TAxEs.
An action was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant on a
promissory note. The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's suit,
on the ground that he had not filed an affidavit that the taxes had been
paid on the debt, as required by the Act of 1870. The plaintiff was a
non-resident of this state: Held, That inasmuch as the plaintiff was a
non-resident of the state there was no tax, due by him on the debt,
which he was bound to pay: lcDonaid & Go. v. Feagani, Sherif, 42
or 43 Ga.
Usury. See Bills and ilrotes.
